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Natural gas became available to the public in New Brunswick on 22 March 2001. 
A celebration of sorts was held to mark the occasion at Mama’s Pub on the north side of 
Fredericton. In attendance was the premier of the day, Bernard Lord, various ministers, and natural gas 
executives. Then-owner of Mama’s Pub, Paul Elliot, expressed the hope, which was shared widely by 
others in the province, that the arrival of natural gas would transform energy pricing in New Brunswick. 
“We’re thrilled to finally have access to natural gas,” said Elliot. “This is going to make our business 
more competitive and more profitable because of the significant cost savings we will enjoy because of 
natural gas.” 
It’s not how things turned out. 
Fourteen years after becoming the first commercial natural gas customer in Atlantic Canada, 
Mama’s Pub has become a symbol of widespread disappointment in the fuel. Mama’s has already 
replaced its natural gas water heater to go back to electric. And new owner Brad Cain says if he could 
afford to shut down more of his natural gas appliances, he would. “As far as kitchen equipment goes, 
we’d love to but it’s so expensive to switch over. We’ll probably start switching one by one,” says Cain. 
“It’s ridiculous.” 
Natural gas in New Brunswick is actually cheaper than electricity—most of the time—but Cain’s 
frustration is not unusual, and many people wonder why the fuel isn’t half the price it currently sells for 
in the province—or less. And it’s not an unreasonable question. 
Natural gas is an incredibly cheap fuel throughout much of North America: one third the price of 
oil, even at $45 a barrel. But what really makes it cheap to use is the method of delivering it to 
customers, with pipes underground directly connecting users to the supply. It is an efficient and low-cost 
delivery system. At least outside of New Brunswick it is. 
Anywhere in southern Ontario, for example, a business that consumed 100 gigajoules of natural 
gas in August of 2015 would have paid $119.77 plus tax in delivery charges to the gas company. That 
doesn’t include the cost of the gas itself—just the cost to deliver it to the business. 
One hundred gigajoules of gas holds the equivalent energy of about 2,800 litres of gasoline, so 
the delivery charge for natural gas in southern Ontario is, in gasoline terms, about 4 cents a litre.  
But in New Brunswick, the delivery of 100 gigajoules of natural gas to a business in August 
2015 would have been $1,287.62 plus taxes. That’s ten times more in delivery costs, and in gasoline 
terms more like 40 cents a litre. 
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True, southern Ontario has millions of people packed into a confined area, and it offers an 
economy of scale to gas companies that New Brunswick will never enjoy. Still, try to think of any 
consumer product or service that is priced seven times more in Moncton than it is in Markham. 
Electricity is actually cheaper in New Brunswick than it is in southern Ontario, with similar 
economy of scale issues. And although lots of things are more expensive in New Brunswick—flights to 
Paris, for example—they are never 900 percent more expensive. That kind of a price premium is 
unheard of, except to commercial customers of natural gas in New Brunswick. 
But forget about southern Ontario. Getting 100 gigajoules of natural gas delivered to a business 
to more remote northern Ontario locations like Thunder Bay (population 110,000) or Fort Frances 
(population 8,000) is 80 percent cheaper than in New Brunswick. 
Then again, forget about Ontario altogether. In Bangor, Maine, which got natural gas at the same 
time as New Brunswick from the same Nova Scotia gas fields and delivered by the same pipeline, a 
business can get 100 gigajoules of natural gas delivered for about 70 percent less than a business in New 
Brunswick, even after currency conversion. 
So how did that happen? 
The origin of New Brunswick’s natural gas pricing problems—especially high prices to deliver 
gas to customers—is still the subject of some debate. But there are two main suspects. Some say the 
provincial government killed the chances for low prices with a decision it made before gas even arrived 
in New Brunswick. Others blame a series of lousy decisions and self-inflicted errors made by Enbridge 
after gas arrived—Enbridge the company that owns the underground pipes that distribute gas in New 
Brunswick. Likely it is a combination of the two. 
A Critical Political Decision 
Natural gas came to New Brunswick rapidly in the late 1990s after a consortium of oil 
companies, including ExxonMobil and Shell, announced in 1996 that they were finally prepared to 
develop an offshore gas industry in Nova Scotia. 
In New Brunswick, that forced some immediate policy decisions on the provincial government. 
The primary market for the gas was to be in the U.S., and that triggered the need for the construction of 
a pipeline that would run through Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to the border with Maine. The 
National Energy Board (NEB) was in charge of approving the Canadian section of the pipeline, and it 
adopted an interesting position on its construction and financing that provided an opportunity and posed 
a problem for New Brunswick. 
The NEB said the pipeline could be constructed either in a straight line to the U.S. border, or in a 
straight line with various branches, or laterals, coming off to bring gas to New Brunswick communities 
like Saint John at the same time it reached the U.S. Better yet, the company building the pipeline 
proposed, and the NEB agreed, that if the laterals were built around the same time as the main line, it 
would fold all of its costs into a single price that all users of the pipeline would pay for. The proposal 
meant that if 75 percent of the gas from Nova Scotia eventually went to the U.S., then 75 percent of the 
cost of the New Brunswick laterals would be paid for by tolls on U.S. customers. 
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It had the potential to be a great deal for New Brunswick, but it came with a catch. In order for a 
lateral to be built to a location, customers in that location would have to make a long-term commitment 
to buy enough gas from the lateral to make it viable. 
Normally that commitment would be made by the local gas distribution company, but that was a 
problem because New Brunswick had not yet picked who would run the province’s natural gas 
distribution system. Different groups were competing for the role, including a group backed by 
Enbridge, but none of the contenders could make commitments to a lateral until the province chose who 
the distributor would be. 
Large New Brunswick industries like Irving Oil Ltd. and JD Irving Ltd. had a different idea. 
They signed contracts with the pipeline company, Maritimes & Northeast, to be the anchor customers on 
their own. That would make the lateral viable, but the Irving companies proposed to go ahead only if 
they could buy gas directly from the main pipeline. 
In other words, the Irvings wanted to avoid dealing with—and paying into—the province’s 
public distribution system when a company was finally chosen to build and run it. And the companies 
made it clear that if they could not have a guarantee from the province that they could operate outside of 
the distribution system, they would not commit to buying any gas at all, meaning that the lateral would 
have no backer. 
In 1998, during the single year that New Brunswick was led by Premier Camille Thériault (after 
the resignation of Frank McKenna), the province set up a committee of MLAs to study how New 
Brunswick should proceed. 
At a hearing in Saint John in September 1998, Arthur and Kenneth Irving from Irving Oil, and 
Jim Irving from JD Irving, all appeared personally to press their case that industry would buy gas only 
outside of a public distribution system. “All bets are off,” said Kenneth Irving about buying any natural 
gas if industry had to purchase from a public distribution system. “If we’re going to have extra costs 
we’re better off not to go ahead,” echoed his cousin Jim Irving. 
Fredericton businessman Bud Bird, who headed the group of Enbridge-linked investors that was 
eventually awarded the public distribution system one year later in 1999, was also at the Saint John 
hearing. Bird had been campaigning hard against the Irving position all through 1998. He told CBC 
News in July 1998 that if the province agreed to the Irving plan to buy its natural gas outside of a public 
distribution system it would wreck the economics of getting gas to the public. “The transfer of that load 
directly away from the provincial distribution system will diminish the potential or the feasibility of the 
system if not perhaps mortally wound it,” Bird said. 
In September, Bird was in attendance as the Irvings made their case directly to the committee of 
MLAs, and he told reporters they were bluffing. “I doubt they’re going to cut off their noses to spite 
their faces,” said Bird, who insisted that all Irving companies would buy gas from a distributor if it were 
cheaper than alternatives. 
But MLAs were not so sure. Committee member and Progressive Conservative MLA Peter 
Mesheau said it was hard to know if the Irving family was serious or not. “I’m sure there’s a certain 
degree of bluff there,” said Mesheau. “Will Mr. Irving if he doesn’t get what he wants pack up his toys 
and move away? Well that’s a possibility.” 
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Despite Bird’s efforts, the MLA committee worried deeply about the Irving threat to abandon 
natural gas if it didn’t get its way, and, under this pressure, the committee eventually backed completely 
the position put forward by the family. ”Without anchor customers, it is very unlikely there will be 
laterals, and without laterals, gas availability will be severely limited in the province,” wrote the 
committee in its eventual report. “The imposition of distribution charges on anchor loads could threaten 
the economic viability of their conversions and, consequently, the viability of the laterals.” 
It was a complete victory for the Irving position, a victory coloured by Bud Bird’s ominous and 
eerily prophetic warning that New Brunswick would be stuck with an unworkable system for the public. 
“This recommendation reflects a short-term view of industrial preference and if it is adopted we believe 
will come at great expense to natural gas service to small business and residential users,” said Bird. 
But the recommendation from the committee of MLAs was adopted. Instead of awarding one 
natural gas distribution franchise to serve all customers in New Brunswick, the province awarded seven. 
One franchise to Bud Bird’s group of investors—including Enbridge—to set up a system to serve the 
public, and six independent franchises to individual industries, most of those to Irving companies. 
The effect was significant. By 2013 the total consumption of natural gas in New Brunswick had 
risen to 19.2 million gigajoules, but less than one third of that—6.2 million gigajoules—travelled 
through and helped to pay for the public distribution system. The rest travelled directly to industry 
outside of the public system. 
Enbridge general manager in New Brunswick Gilles Volpe says today that Bud Bird’s warnings 
in 1998 about industry undermining the viability of the public distribution system by operating outside 
of it have been proven true. “Those single end use franchises don’t contribute to the operational costs of 
the public distribution system,” says Volpe. “So because the costs are borne by a fewer number of 
customers and a fewer amount of throughput, the per unit cost becomes higher for everybody and the 
rates [to the public] in New Brunswick are higher because of that.” 
However, others dispute that explanation and offer another reason for New Brunswick’s natural 
gas pricing problems: miscalculations and missteps inside the public system by Enbridge itself. 
Early Business Mistakes 
Bud Bird lost the fight with the Irvings over how natural gas would be distributed in New 
Brunswick in 1998, and his investor group knew there would be no large industrial customers in the 
public distribution system for several months before the public franchise was to be awarded. That gave 
Bird’s group plenty of time to abandon its bid, which is exactly what two other groups who were 
initially in the running did. But Bird’s group, which included Enbridge, re-evaluated its contention that 
industrial customers were critical to a public system, and decided to forge ahead. They felt a public 
system might be viable anyway, and when the public franchise was finally granted to Enbridge almost 
by default in August 1999, the company began drawing up plans and budgets for how everything would 
work. 
Because the public natural gas distribution system would be a monopoly, the province placed 
oversight in the hands of the Public Utilities Board (PUB). Under the name Enbridge Gas New 
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Brunswick, Enbridge and a group of local investors headed by Bird began appearing in front of the PUB 
almost immediately to seek approval for its plans to move forward. 
Enbridge is probably the most experienced natural gas operator in Canada, and there was a 
general belief it knew what it was doing. But the company made critical errors from the start, which it 
foreshadowed at its first rate hearing in 2000. “No textbook exists to spell out exactly how a company 
such as ours should prepare and implement its plans,” said Arunas Pleckaitis, the first president of 
Enbridge Gas New Brunswick. “While Enbridge has extensive experience in operating a natural gas 
utility, it is important to recognize the complexities and uncertainties associated with starting up a 
greenfield [new] operation.” 
Pleckaitis was right—there was no textbook to explain how to start a natural gas distribution 
system from scratch—especially one without large industrial customers to help pay its bills. But if a 
textbook ever does get written, New Brunswick may well get its own chapter, “What Not To Do.” 
Unlike the Maritimes & Northeast pipeline company, which had wanted guaranteed customers 
before building laterals, Enbridge was confident that large numbers of New Brunswick customers would 
present themselves once it built a distribution system. To make that happen, Enbridge proposed to set 
the overall price of natural gas in New Brunswick—distribution charges and gas charges combined—
just below the price of its chief competitors, electricity and heating oil. The plan was to offer residential 
customers a 30 percent discount on the price of oil, with commercial, institutional, and smaller industrial 
customers saving between 5 and 15 percent. 
The company submitted a planning document to the PUB showing it expected to attract 71,000 
customers to the public distribution system by the time its twenty-year franchise expired in 2019, 
including 3,700 by the end of 2001 and a strong growing base of 16,800 customers by the end of 2005. 
Those projections formed the basis of how the system was to be built and financed in New Brunswick. 
They were also grossly inaccurate. 
Based on the number of natural gas customers Enbridge felt it could attract, the company 
proposed to spend $300 million installing a network of pipes initially in Moncton, Riverview, Dieppe, 
Fredericton, Saint John, and St. George. Although that was a lot of money, Enbridge felt that customers 
would appear so quickly the project’s debt load would be minimal. 
Enbridge executive Lino Luison said the company’s plans all hinged on one thing: getting its 
targeted number of customers signed up rapidly as the pipes went in the ground. “Ultimately [in our 
planning] we always tried to land on whatever it would take to attract customers,” said Luison. “The 
success of this opportunity relies on us adding customers as quickly as possible.” 
But if adding customers quickly was to be the measure of success, there must have been concern 
in Enbridge offices early. Conversion to natural gas required customers to buy a new furnace, and with 
that upfront cost weighed against the long-term savings being offered, many customers didn’t bite. 
More Policy Trouble 
A second problem was that in awarding the distribution franchise to Enbridge, the province 
originally forbade Enbridge, the monopoly distributor, from retailing natural gas to customers. Enbridge 
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could charge natural gas users a distribution fee, but the actual gas would have to be purchased from 
another supplier. It was like NB Power, because it generates electricity, being barred from retailing 
electricity, or Irving Oil, because it manufactures gasoline at its own refinery, not being allowed to 
operate gas stations. The province wanted to introduce more competitors into the natural gas business, 
but the policy produced a different outcome. 
In the early days of natural gas in New Brunswick there were no customers—zero—so the 
number of companies wanting to sell natural gas was low. And the ones that did come forward to sell 
ran businesses that competed with natural gas. Park Fuels and Irving Oil, for instance, both became 
natural gas retailers, but both had thousands of established customers who they already serviced with 
furnace oil. Why would either try and get its own bill-paying oil customers to switch to natural gas? In 
Enbridge’s view, they wouldn’t—and didn’t. As Enbridge spent significant money to build its 
distribution network, customers were slow to show themselves. In fact, natural gas conversions and 
signups fell so far behind schedule that, by 2004, Enbridge had barely reached the number of customers 
it had projected for 2001, and things got worse from there. 
Instead of 16,800 customers by the end of 2005, Enbridge executives Andrew Harrington and 
Shelley Black told the PUB in October 2004 that it would be lucky to reach 5,200 by that time, less than 
one third of its target. With that result, the company began acknowledging that its plan of winning over 
large numbers quickly had been misguided (however, after the province lifted its ban on Enbridge 
retailing natural gas directly to customers in 2003, that fell away as an excuse). 
Getting customers signed up quickly had been job number one for the company, yet four years 
into the effort Enbridge was failing miserably and didn’t seem to know why. “Neither Enbridge Gas 
New Brunswick nor the [Public Utilities] Board could have reasonably expected such wide variances 
from forecast,” was all Harrington and Black could say in a letter to the PUB in 2004. 
It was a significant problem. Every year in the critical early years of building the distribution 
system customer targets were being missed by a wide margin—bad enough—but those missed targets 
were creating chaos in the distribution system’s financing. 
A System Built on Credit, Not Customers 
In 2000, to deal with its upfront costs, Enbridge had applied for and received permission to 
establish a deferral account. Enbridge executives told the PUB that the company was willing to spend 
more than it made for several years to get the distribution system up and running, and that the deferral 
account would be used to record expenses Enbridge incurred that exceeded revenues in the early years. 
Enbridge said that as its customer base expanded, the deferral account would eventually stop growing 
and then be paid off as the business matured. 
Based on estimates of how much it would cost to install pipes, and company projections of how 
quickly customers would sign up to use and pay for that equipment, Enbridge felt it was reasonable to 
expect the deferral account to peak at $13 million sometime during 2008 before the company would be 
in a position to start paying it off. Enbridge said its plan was to keep the deferral account as small as 
possible, because if it grew too large it would put the entire business in New Brunswick at risk. “If the 
company mismanages this [deferral], our long-term costs per customer served will be higher than 
planned. In turn, if our long-term costs per customer are higher than planned, we will have fewer 
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customers. This scenario represents one which the company is absolutely incented to avoid,” Enbridge’s 
Arunas Pleckaitis told the PUB. 
At the same time, Pleckaitis made it clear that Enbridge wasn’t running a charity, either. 
Although the company said it wanted to keep money that ended up in the deferral account to a 
minimum, it wanted to earn a fair return on whatever that amount happened to be for as long as it sat 
there. “It is generally accepted that a greenfield venture is considerably more risky than a mature 
utility,” said Pleckaitis who wanted the financial rewards for Enbridge to match the risk it was taking in 
New Brunswick. 
Others worried that allowing Enbridge a fat return on expenses that went into a deferral account 
would create an incentive for the company to overbuild and overspend. After all, the more money that 
went into the deferral account, the more interest it would generate that would have to be paid back to 
Enbridge over time by customers. Christopher Stewart, a lawyer for Irving Oil Ltd., warned that 
Enbridge could make a lot of money for itself if the interest it was allowed to earn on the deferral 
account was set too high and the amounts that went into the account were more than expected. 
“Enbridge Gas New Brunswick should be incented to keep the balances as low as possible,” said 
Stewart. “There should not be an incentive to make them higher than they should be. It should not be a 
profit centre for them.” 
But the Public Utilities Board seemed unconcerned. “There must be a premium to compensate 
Enbridge for this risk,” wrote the PUB in its 2000 decision on how the deferral account would work. The 
PUB decided that Enbridge would have to treat half of the money in the deferral account as debt, and 
collect interest on it at the cost of borrowing money, but that the other half could be treated as equity, 
and Enbridge could collect a robust 13 percent per year return on that amount. It seemed a minor issue at 
the time, but as Enbridge’s building program and expenses grew, and customer recruitment flopped, the 
deferral account became exactly what Stewart warned about and what Pleckaitis insisted it could not be 
allowed to become: a runaway debt train. 
Looking forward during those initial hearings in 2000, Enbridge had predicted the deferral 
account would grow maybe to $12 million by the end of 2005. But that assumed 16,800 customers by 
then, whereas Enbridge had signed up less than one third of that number. There was not enough 
customer income to match expenses, and the deferral account, to continue the metaphor, began to leave 
the station. Instead of reaching $12 million in 2005, the account raced past $75 million—six times more 
than predicted. And not only did the lack of customers cause it to keep growing after 2005 as Enbridge 
kept building, but the balance in the deferral account was now so high that the magic of compound 
interest began to multiply it like a virus. Three years later, in 2008, when it was supposed to peak at $13 
million, the deferral account hit $140 million. Two years after that, in 2010, it passed $170 million. 
Trying to cope with the rapidly escalating balance of the deferral account prevented Enbridge 
from lowering rates to attract more customers, just as Pleckaitis said would happen (back in 2000) if the 
deferral account was not kept under control. 
By 2010, every original projection Enbridge made about how the distribution system would grow 
and prosper was in a shambles. And so was every revised projection. In 2004, Enbridge had reworked its 
original plan to have 35,000 customers by 2010 down to a more “realistic” estimate of 18,000. When 
2010 actually arrived, fewer than 11,000 were on the system. By then the deferral account was thirteen 
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times larger than originally planned and rates to the limited customers Enbridge did have had to be kept 
up, not just to run and build the distribution system, but to feed the deferral account’s enormous interest 
costs and slow its relentless growth. 
That is why rates, like those charged to Mama’s Pub in Fredericton, had to be ten times higher 
than businesses in other jurisdictions like Mamma’s Pizza in Toronto. 
Who to Blame 
Generally, users of natural gas in New Brunswick are still paying less than if they used 
alternative fuels like oil, but the promise of natural gas producing huge energy savings for consumers 
and businesses—like the fuel does outside of New Brunswick—has been a bitter disappointment. 
There is plenty of evidence that Enbridge itself is at fault for much of that, for it made a clear-
eyed decision to build a distribution system even though it knew a large industrial load would be 
missing. It grossly overestimated the number of customers it could attract based on the savings it was 
offering, first in 2000 and then again in 2004. It set out to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to build 
a system for 71,000 users that 11,000 now pay for. 
Still, there is also an argument that none of that would have happened if it wasn’t for the original 
decision by the province to exempt so much industrial load from having to use and help pay for one 
public system for everyone’s use. In Enbridge’s view, industrial use of the public distribution system 
would have generated critical early and reliable income that could have kept the system’s debt load and 
interest expenses considerably lower. That would have allowed for better rates for everyone, which 
likely would have improved customer recruitment efforts. That in turn would have spread costs over a 
larger group, further lowering prices. 
When asked about problems with the distribution network in 2011, Jim Irving blamed a lack of 
load on the system as its central weakness. “It’s broken. It’s a mess,” said Irving. ”This thing is not right. 
If we’re ever going to build a strong distribution network, we need volume.” 
On that point, Irving and Enbridge agree. Enbridge’s current general manager, Gilles Volpe, says 
New Brunswick would be having an entirely different experience with natural gas if not for that very 
first government decision to exempt so much industrial volume from the public system. “The public 
good I think has suffered,” said Volpe. “The public distribution system is charging higher rates because 
these single end use franchises are not part of the system. Not to say after fifteen years of operations 
they [the public] would be paying the same rates as they do in Ontario or Arkansas, but I suspect that 
they would be lower than they are today.” 
Eventually the province itself seemed to come around to the idea that maybe Volpe, and Bud 
Bird before him, had a point. Perhaps the distribution system’s problems were not entirely of Enbridge’s 
making, and that those exemptions for big industry really did handicap the public system from the 
beginning. 
In a change of thinking in 2014, the New Brunswick Legislature passed a new law requiring the 
six industrial holders of independent franchises to begin contributing money to support the public 
system. Not that the hammer fell too hard. 
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The required payments into the public system won’t begin until the six industrials’ current 
franchise agreements expire in 2019. And when those payments do start, the amount the companies have 
to pay—10 cents per gigajoule—will be significantly cheaper than industrial rates elsewhere, like in 
Ontario. The amount will also be less than 1 percent of the rates commercial businesses in New 
Brunswick, like Mama’s Pub in Fredericton, continue to be saddled with. 
Robert Jones is a reporter with CBC News, New Brunswick. 
